ABSTRACT Recently, Esfahani, Mantas, and Rodriguez proposed a homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) scheme for the random linear network coding (RLNC) to resist tag pollution attacks (TPAs), and also presented the security analysis. As Esfahani et al. said, their scheme is based on the null space properties of Kehdi and Li, and the main contribution lies in adding the process of swapping when generating the tags for data packets. However, in this paper, we first point out that Esfahani et al.'s swapping technique is not essential for the TPA security, because the underlying non-swapping homomorphic MAC scheme has been secure against TPA and the process of swapping only improves the TPA security with a non-negligible factor. More importantly, we find that the security proof of Esfahani et al. is incorrect and misguided. In particular, according to Esfahani et al. suggestion, one should enlarge the number of neighbor nodes to reduce the probability of the TPA. However, this paper gives contrary suggestions in Esfahani et al.'s work by presenting the precise proof for the proposed homomorphic MAC scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random linear network coding scheme allows the intermediate nodes (or routers) to randomly mix the packets they received before forwarding them, which has been theoretically proven to maximize the network throughput [2] , [7] , [15] , [16] . However, it is well known that RLNC is susceptible to pollution attacks, including data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks.
Informally, data pollution attack refers to that some malicious nodes do not honestly mix data part of the packets they received, which results in their output packets also being polluted. Moreover, the corrupted packets will go on polluting other nodes in an epidemic way. In contrast to data pollution attack, TPA refers to that the adversaries only pollute the tags, which are usually appended to the end of packets, while keeping the data part unchanged. In some schemes, such as [17] , [18] , a data packet may be appended multiple tags, each
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node only verifies a subset of them. As a result, it is possible for an attacker to tamper with a tag that will only be verified farther down the information flow. The consequences of such attacks may be devastating, not only because they evade early detection but also because errors in a single tag may snowball into errors in many tags, which results in numerous packets failing authentication and being subsequently dropped [12] .
Homomorphic MAC is an important cryptographic primitive, which can be used to protect RLNC from pollution attacks [2] . If one homomorphic MAC scheme produces multiple tags for each data packet, then there usually are two classical modes of verification for the intermediate or destination nodes. The first one is that each node only verifies part of the tags, such as the mode proposed in [2] , [18] . The other one is that each node verifies all the tags, such as that of [6] , [17] .
Observing that the existing homomorphic MAC schemes, which are immune to TPA, have the feature that tags usually have a fixed position in the coded packet and hence can be easily controlled by adversaries, Esfahani, Mantas, VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
and Rodriguez recently introduced a null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme (EMR-scheme, for short) to change the situation [6] . As Esfahani et al. said, the algorithms of tag generation and verification in EMR-scheme are based on the null space properties of [9] . Hence, their main contribution lies in adding the process of swapping. More specifically, in EMR-scheme, the generated tags are swapped with the data part they authenticate with the help of a secret swapping value SV , which increases the difficulty of launching TPA. Finally, they also analyzed probabilities of guessing SV and launching TPA for an adversary node. However, in this comment, we first point out the underlying non-swapped homomorphic MAC scheme (for EMR-scheme), which essentially equals to the null-spacebased scheme in [9] , is secure against TPA and the process of swapping only increases the difficulty of TPA with a non-negligible factor L n+L , where L is the number of tags for each data packet and n is the essential length of the data packet. In other words, the security against TPA for EMR-scheme is based on the underlying non-swapped homomorphic MAC scheme. More importantly, we find out that the security proof presented by Esfahani et al. is incorrect and misguided. In particular, when estimating the probability of launching TPA (for an adversary), they claimed that, if the adversary node has d neighbor nodes, then the probability is bounded by a negligible value 1/L d . Therefore, in order to reduce the probability of TPA, one has to enlarge the number of neighbor nodes when fixing L, which complicates the network. However, we draw the opposite conclusion (for the EMR-scheme): The larger the number of neighbor nodes, the bigger the probability of TPA.
A. RELATED WORKS
In fact, in cryptography, homomorphic signature scheme is another technique to protect network coding against pollution attack [3] - [5] , [11] . Contrast to homomorphic MAC scheme, it is a kind of public key authentication method. In fact, their differences are similar to that between symmetric encryption and public key encryption systems [1] , [13] , [14] . In [10] , Kim discussed the incorrectness of another homomorphic MAC scheme with small key size for authentication in network coding.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first recall the definition of negligible function, which is often used to bound the winning probabilities of adversaries in security games for many cryptographic notions [8] .
Formally, a function negl(λ) is called negligible if for any c > 0, there exists λ 0 such that negl(λ) < λ −c for any λ > λ 0 . For example, 1/2 λ is negligible but 1/λ 5 is not. More generally, any reciprocal of exponent function (of λ) is negligible but that of polynomial function is not.
Next, we briefly introduce the model of RLNC and the TPA on it [6] , [9] , [12] , [17] . Concretely, in RLNC, there are 3 types of nodes: Source node, intermediate nodes as well as destination nodes, which work as follows.
• A source node S divides a file F (to be transmitted) into
where q is a function of security parameter λ and satisfies F q is a finite field. In order to quickly decode, S augments the m vectors as
, and transmits them. Those augmented vectors are also called data packets.
• When receiving data packets, such as w 1 , · · · , w ∈ F m+n q , the intermediate nodes randomly chooses α 1 , · · · , α ∈ F q , computes and transmits
• In order to recover the original file F, each destination node need to collect any m linearly independent packets
Finally, recover the vectors u 1 , · · · , u m (i.e. the file F) from the following system:
In Fig. 1 , we present a simplified version of the system (m = 2). When a homomorphic MAC scheme is applied to the above RLNC, the source node (in some form) appends the generated tag(s) to each data packet, which forms the data-tag packet. Hence, all packets transmitted between the nodes in RLNC are data-tag packets. For a TPA adversary, its goal is polluting the tag part while keeping the data part invariant. If the homomorphic MAC scheme generates multiple tags for each data packet and the tags are appended at the end of the data packet, then the TPAs may include the following two types.
• Type 1. The tags are generated from independent keys, which are randomly assigned to the intermediate and destination nodes, and every node only verifies part of tags (using the corresponding keys). A concrete example can be found in Fig. 2 , in which the node N 2 is an adversary and it pollutes the tag t 4 . The polluted data-tag packet is discarded by N 4 since it has the key K 4 , which is used to verify t 4 . But it is accepted by N 3 (owning the key K 1 ), which results in the receiver R 1 accepting it.
• Type 2. The tags are jointly generated by using all the keys and every node verifies all of them. In Fig. 3 , we also present a concrete example. More specifically, the polluted data-tag packet produced by N 2 may pass the verification of N 5 and R 2 but can not be accepted by N 4 . Obviously, the larger the number of neighbor nodes for N 2 , the bigger the probability of TPA. The reason lies in that TPA occurs if at least one of its neighbor nodes accepts the polluted packet but not all of them accept it. We remark that the homomorphic MAC schemes in Section III and IV belong to Type 2 but not to Type 1.
In addition, if the tags are appended to the data packet in a secret way (like EMR-scheme), then the TPA adversary has to first find out one or more tags before polluting them.
All in all, an intact TPA process (for an adversary) consists of the following three steps: 1) Find the tag(s); 2) Pollute it (or them);
3) Let its neighbor node(s) accept the polluted data-tag packet. Therefore, one has to compute the probabilities of all steps when estimating the probability of TPA. In fact, the first two probabilities usually equal to 1 if the generated tags have fix positions for a homomorphic MAC scheme and, hence need not be explicitly calculated. But they should be explicitly compute if it becomes difficulty to finding the tag(s).
III. NON-SWAPPED HOMOMORPHIC MAC SCHEME AND ITS SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we first present the non-swapped homomorphic MAC scheme, which essentially is the null-space-based scheme in [9] , and then prove that itself is secure against TPA.
A. NON-SWAPPED HOMOMORPHIC MAC SCHEME
The non-swapped homomorphic MAC scheme consists of the following algorithms:
center (KDC) randomly chooses
Then adopt a key distribution model, which is same as that of [6] , and assign only one key to each intermediate or destination node.
• Tag Generation. Using the L keys, S creates L tags
Or equivalently,
Then, the tags are appended to the end of u, which forms the data-tag packet and is denoted by u. That is,
• Verification. For an intermediate or destination node N i , who owns the key K i , it checks if
If it is, then the coded packet u is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected. Obviously, from (3), we know that every key K i is used to verify all the L tags. The correctness of this scheme can be verified easily.
B. SECURITY PROOF
As for the security of the scheme presented in subsection III-A, we will know that it is secure against TPA from the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The non-swapped homomorphic MAC scheme is secure against TPA. Concretely, if A is an adversary who launches TPA on the scheme, then it will success with probability at most d/q, where d is the number of its neighbor nodes. Obviously, when fixing q, the larger d, the bigger the probability of TPA.
Proof: Since the tags for the data packet u has a fixed position, the adversary A can find them and pollute one or more of them with probability 1. Next, we analyze the probability that the polluted tag(s) passes the verifications of its neighbor nodes.
q be the original unpolluted tags of the data packet u = (u 1 , · · · , u m+n ) ∈ F m+n q . Without loss of generality, we assume that the first i 0 (i 0 ≤ L) tags are changed into t 1 , · · · , t i 0 . Naturally, t i = t i , for all i ∈ {1, · · · , i 0 }. Denote by u and u the unpolluted and polluted data-tag packets, respectively. That is,
We first consider the corrupted node has only one neighbor node N j , who has the key
. From the correctness of the homomorphic MAC scheme, we know that the unpolluted data-tag packet u can naturally pass the verification of N j . That is,
In addition, the polluted data-tag packet u can pass verification of N j only if
By (4) minus (5), we have
or equivalently,
which occurs with probability of 1/q. 1 If the adversary node has d (d > 1) neighbor nodes, then, let E i denote the event that i-th neighbor node accepts the polluted packets. Since the keys K i of different nodes are independent, E 1 , · · · , E d are mutually independent. Therefore,
Remark 1: If choosing a larger field F q , which satisfies 1/q is a negligible function, then d/q is still negligible. But this way may result in larger communication overhead and computational complexity. Hence, another technique to decreasing the probability of TPA to a negligible level is using multiple independent tags, which is also used in [2] , [12] .
IV. EMR-SCHEME AND ITS SECURITY PROOF
A. EMR-SCHEME
In [6] , Esfahani et al. proposed the EMR-scheme, which is a swapped version of the scheme in Section III. Here, we only sketch it, since its concrete description can be found in [6] .
More concisely, in the tag-generation algorithm of EMRscheme, the source node S first computes the tags t 1 , · · · , t L (for the data packet u) from the system (1). Instead of appending them to end of u, it chooses a secret swapping value SV , which is also known by the destination nodes, and swaps the L tags with only L out of n symbols of u, which is determined by SV . Hence, the tags do not have a fixed position as before. Meanwhile, because the intermediate nodes do not know the secret SV , they have some difficulties to find the real tags when launching the TPA.
The forms of the keys owned by intermediate and destination nodes should also be adjusted since the construction of the data-tag packet is changed. As a result, in EMR-scheme, the KDC creates new keys
on the swapping value SV , and assigns them according the key distribution model.
B. SECURITY PROOF OF THE EMR-SCHEME
Theorem 2: The EMR-scheme is secure against TPA. Concretely, if A is an adversary who launches TPA on the EMR-scheme, then it can success with probability at most Ld (n+L)q , where d is the number of its neighbor nodes.
Proof: First, we compute the probability (denoted by P 1 ) that A successfully finds out a tag of some data packet u. From the description of EMR-scheme, we know that, for a swapped data-tag packet u := Swap(u) SV , the L tags are continuously contained in the last n + L items of the vector u which is determined by SV . Hence, the probability of finding a tag equals to L n+L by randomly guessing its position, which is not negligible.
After successfully finding a tag t j 0 , the adversary A may change it into t j 0 ( = t j 0 ) (i.e. polluting the tag).
Finally, the probability (denoted by P 2 ) that the polluted tag t j 0 can pass the verification of its neighbor nodes can be estimated in a similar way as that in the proof of Theorem 1. Hence, it holds that
Putting all the facts together, we know that A can launch a TPA on the EMR-scheme with probability at most
From the security analysis of the non-swapped and EMR homomorphic MAC schemes, we know that the EMR-scheme improve the security level from d q of nonswapped scheme to Ld (n+L)q . However, the factor L n+L is not negligible. Hence, the improvement is not essential.
V. INCORRECTNESS OF THE ORIGINAL PROOF IN [6]
In this section, we analyze Esfahani et al.'s proof about their scheme and point out its incorrectness.
Concretely, in the subsection B of IV in [6] , the authors computed the probability of launching TPA and concluded that if the adversary has only one neighbor node, the probability is bounded by 1/L and if it has multiple neighbor nodes, such as d, the security can be enhanced to 1/L d . Therefore, if the claims are correct, when fixing the number L, one has to enlarge d so that the probability of successfully launching a TPA becomes smaller, which results in the network being more complicated.
However, we find out that their analysis is not correct. The reason is as follows.
First, the analysis of probability from one neighbor node to multiple nodes is not correct, since TPA occurs if at least one of its neighbor node accepts the corrupted packet but not all of them accept it. Therefore, if the neighbor nodes own independent keys, then the more neighbor nodes, the larger the probability of TPA occurring. In fact, Esfahani et al.
Second, in the case of one neighbor node, their probability estimate (i.e. 1/L) is inappropriate. In fact, we know that 1/L is a non-negligible function of λ since the whole scheme must be run in polynomial time. From the above analysis, we know that the probability of TPA occurring must also be non-negligible no matter the adversary has one or more neighbor nodes, which results in the insecurity against TPA for EMR-scheme. Hence, from Theorem 2, we know that the estimate 1/L for one neighbor node is not appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
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